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Abstract: The significant increase in the concentration ratio in Turkey’s fluid milk market has heightened concern about the exercise
of market power. During 1980-98, the 4-firm concentration ratio and Herfindahl index increased by 11% and 33%, respectively.
In this study, we estimated the degree of imperfection in the fluid milk market at retail level using the New Empirical Industrial
Organization approach during the period 1980-98. For this purpose, the demand equation and first-order-profit maximization
condition, which allow the degree of market power to be determined, were estimated. Using 2-stage-least-square estimation, market
power was found to be 0.11. This parameter shows that the fluid milk market is not perfectly competitive, but the behavior of firms
is much closer to price taking than to collusion.
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Türkiye’de Süt Sektörü Rekabetçimidir?
Özet: Türkiye süt sektöründe dört firma yo¤unlu¤undaki önemli art›fl bu sektörde pazar gücü ile ilgili endiflelerin artmas›na neden
olmufltur. 1980-1998 döneminde, dört firma yo¤unlu¤u ve Herfindahl indeksi s›ras›yla % 11 ve % 33 art›fl göstermifltir. Bu
çal›flmada ‘Yeni Endüstriyel Organizasyon’ yaklafl›m› ile Türkiye’de süt sektörünün pazar gücü perakende seviyesinde 1980-98
dönemi için tahmin edilmifltir. Pazar gücünü ortaya koyabilmek için talep denklemi ve kar maksimizasyonuna ait birinci seviyeden
türev denklemleri elde edilmifltir. ‹ki aflamal› en küçük kareler yöntemi kullan›larak pazar gücü katsay›s› 0,11 bulunmufltur. Bu pazar
gücü katsay›s›, Türkiye’de süt sektörünün tam rekabet flartlar›nda olmad›¤›n› fakat bu sektördeki iflletmelerin ortak hareketle fiyatlar›
belirlemedi¤ini ve fiyat oluflumunun tam rekabet koflullar›na yak›n oldu¤unu ortaya koymaktad›r.
Anahtar Sözcükler: Türkiye süt piyasas›, pazar gücü, rekabet, oligopol

Introduction
Over the last 2 decades, major changes have occurred
in the field of industrial organization. Due to
dissatisfaction with structure-conduct-performance (SCP)
studies, the “New Empirical Industrial Organization”
(NEIO) method has become more popular (1-3). In
contrast to the SCP approach, NEIO studies use aggregate
or firm level data in a single industry, and integrate
microeconomic theory and advanced structural
econometric models based on the price and quantity
decisions of firms to measure market power and other
market structure relationships. There have been
numerous applications of the NEIO approach in the food
and tobacco sectors (4-9).
Today, the food-processing sector consists of a
relatively small number of large firms. Food-processing
companies buy raw products from many farmers,
transform them into multiproduct form, and then market
the products to consumers through wholesalers or

middlemen. The industrial structure often allows foodprocessing companies to affect both the purchasing of
inputs and the selling of products. In essence, they can
exercise market power in the food-processing sector as a
result of imperfect competition.
The objective of this study was to estimate the degree
of imperfect competition in the fluid milk market at retail
level of Turkey. The major contribution of this study is
to highlight the concern about the fluid milk market,
which has been recently scrutinized by the Turkish
competition authority. Moreover, this is one of the first
studies to use the NEIO approach to measure market
power in the Turkish food sector. Given this objective, the
institutional background of the fluid milk market in
Turkey is presented in the first section. The methodology
for estimating market power is given in the second
section. Data sources and results of the econometric
model are given in the third section and a discussion is
provided in the final section.
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Institutional Background
Fluid milk production has significant value among
animal products in Turkey, accounting for 44.3% in
1999 (10). The organizational structure of the fluid milk
subsector is somewhat mixed in that some firms (7%)
use advanced technology. On the other hand, most firms
(93%) are small, and these firms process milk and milk
products under primitive conditions. Modern and
primitive firms produce 56 and 44% of the fluid milk in
Turkey, respectively (11).
Several important legal and institutional changes have
occurred in the fluid milk subsector of Turkey over the
last 2 decades. In 1963, the government established the
‘Milk Industry Organization of Turkey’ (MIOT). The main
purposes of the MIOT were to establish and assure fair
market prices for both milk producers and consumers,
stimulate and lead the private sector, purchase milk from
producers and process milk and milk products at MIOT
plants. The MIOT used several policy tools to achieve
these goals. For example, a milk support program was
introduced for the first time and the MIOT started paying
premiums to dairy farmers depending on the quality of
milk. Moreover, it tried to establish milk cooperatives
among milk producers. Due to the inefficiency of the
MIOT, it was privatized in 1996.
The dairy industry in Turkey is confronted with a
number of structural and institutional problems. One
significant problem is mainly due to the marketing
structure of fluid milk. Around 47% of fluid milk in
Turkey is consumed unpacked, which is often unhygienic
and possibly dangerous for human consumption (12). A
recent study on consumption behavior in the fluid milk
showed that low milk prices and ease of purchase were
major factors affecting the purchasing of unpacked fluid
milk (13). Several researchers indicated that unpacked
fluid milk contained pathogenic organisms above
tolerable limits in Turkey (14-17). In addition a recent
study indicated that about 80% of raw milk was
processed or marketed by various suppliers such as small
backyard operators and individual milk sellers without
safety controls or any financial records (18). In the same
study it was also indicated that as these suppliers operate
without financial records, they have around 20% cost
advantage over modern dairy firms. Hence, this structure
creates unfair competition between small backyard and
modern dairy firms that, in turn, prevents the
development of modern fluid milk processing companies,
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which have only a 20% market share (12,18). Several
researchers indicated that the unstable price of fluid milk,
high prices of roughage and concentrate, insufficient cold
chain and unfair price setting for dairy farmers are other
major problems in the dairy sector (18-22).
Over the last decade, there has been an increase in the
number of private companies entering the fluid milk
market. Pınar and Mis milk are 2 major private
companies that process fluid milk and milk products in
Turkey (23). During 1980-98, the fluid milk subsector
became more concentrated, mainly because of the
growth of the largest manufacturers.
The concentration ratio of an industry is used as an
indicator of the relative size of firms in relation to the
industry as a whole. This ratio assists in determining the
market structure of the industry. The most commonly
used measures of market concentration are the 4-firm
concentration ratio (CR4) and the Herfindahl-Hirschman
index (HHI). CR4 is defined as the market share of the 4
largest firms in the industry. This ratio ranges from
almost 0 for perfect competition to 1 for a monopoly. An
alternative to CR4 that attempts to reflect all the
information in the concentration curve is the HHI. For an
industry with N firms, this is defined as,
n

HHI =

S2i ,
∑
i=1

where Si is the market share of the ith firm. In other
words, the HHI is the sum of squares of the market
shares of all firms in the industry. The HHI takes into
account the relative size and distribution of the firms in a
market. The value of HHI approaches zero implying close
to perfect competition when a market consists of a
relatively large number of firms of equal size (24).
The CR4 and HHI values in the fluid milk subsector of
Turkey are given in the Figure. CR4 showed a rapid
increase from the 40s to 50s during 1980-98. The HHI
ranged from 0.04 to 0.14 during the same period.
McCorriston and Sheldon (25) indicated that a higher
concentration ratio, economies of scale, and product
differentiation are the most important factors enabling
market power and any one of these could indicate the
existence of market power. Given the organizational
structure and increasing concentration ratio, we suspect
market power might be exercised in this subsector.
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Figure. The four-firm concentration ratio (CR4) and Herfindahl Hirschman index (HHI).

Materials and Methods
Suppose that an industry is considered one in which n
firms produce a homogeneous product, (q1,q2,...qn), and
industry output is
n

Q = ∑ qi
i=1

.

Let the market demand in an industry be given by the
implicit function
Qt = Q(Pt,Zt)

[1]

where Qt is the total quantity demanded, Pt is the price of
output, Zt is a vector of exogenous variables that affect
demand such as income and the prices of substitute
products, and t is a time subscript. Suppose also that
aggregate marginal cost (MC) facing the industry is given
by the following equation:
MCt = MC(Qt,Wt)

[2]

where Wt is a vector of exogenous variables such as factor
prices. Assuming that firms are price takers in a given
industry, equilibrium price and quantity will be
determined by
Pt = P(Qt,Zt) = MCt = MC(Qt,Wt)

[3]

Equation 3 indicates that the industry is perfectly
competitive if perceived industry marginal revenue (MR)
equals MC. Defining industry revenue as, Rt = PtQt =
P(Qt,Zt)Qt, the equilibrium condition is given by the
expression
MRt (λ) = P t + λQt dPt = MC (Qt, Wt)
dQt

[4]

where λ is defined as an index of the degree of market
power, that is, the gap between market price and
industry MC (26). Bresnahan (26) argues that λ will range
from 0 for a competitive industry to 1 for a monopoly.
Values between 0 and 1 measure the degree of oligopoly
power in an industry. Alternatively, λ can be interpreted
as conjectural variation. Using a simple duopoly model,
we can illustrate this connection between λ and conjectural
variations. Suppose that firm 1 produces q1 units of
output and expect firm 2 to produce q2e units of output.
Then the total output it expects to be sold is Qt = q1 + q2e.
The profit maximization problem for firm 1 then is
expressed as
Maxq1 = P(Q)q1-C1(q1)

[5]

where P(Q) is the inverse demand function, and C1(q1) is
total cost function for firm 1. Differentiating equation [5]
with respect to q1 and after some manipulations, the first
order condition can be expressed as
P(Q) + dP 1+dq2 q1 = MC 1(q1)
dQ
dq1

[6]

where MC1 (q1) is the marginal cost of firm 1, q2 is the
equilibrium output level of q2e and
dq2
dq1
is the conjectural variation term. It describes how firm 1
conjectures firm 2 will vary its output when firm 1 makes
a small change in output ∆q1. If we assume symmetry
between all n firms in an industry, that is, they have the
same cost function and produce the same amount of
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output, equation [6] can be written for n firms as
follows:
[7]
P(Q) + dP 1+(n-1)v = MC
n
dQ
where v is its conjectural variation about each of its rivals.
Since, from [4], we know that
P t + Qt dPt λ = MC,
dQt
it follows that equations [4] and [7] are identical, where
market power index is defined as
λ = 1+(n-1)v .
n

[8]

It is clear that if firms behave as in perfect
competition, that is, v = -1 and λ = 0, in Cournot-Nash
fashion, the values of v and λ are 0 and 1/n, respectively.
This study uses annual data for 1980 to 1998. These
data were collected from numerous governmental sources.
Data related to the retail prices of milk (Pt), producer price
of milk (Wt) and per-capita domestic product (Zt) were
collected from various publications of the State Institute of
Statistics of Turkey (27). All prices and per-capita gross
domestic product data were deflated by the wholesale
price index and GNP deflator, respectively. The wholesale
price index and GNP deflator were collected from the State
Institute of Statistics of Turkey. Data on the retail quantity
of fluid milk were collected from the State Planning
Organization of Turkey (28).
Regression Analysis and Results
In order to evaluate the degree of imperfection in the
fluid milk market, we need to select functional forms for
industry demand and aggregate MC. The industry
demand function in [1] is expressed in the following
form:
Qt = β0 + β1Pt + β2Z1t + β3Z2t + εt

[9]

where Qt is the quantity of fluid milk sold at retail level,
Pt is the real fluid milk price at retail level, Znt(n=1,2) are
exogenous variables that are defined explicitly in the next
section, and εt is the error term that is normally
distributed with mean µ and variance σ2.
The aggregate MC function was considered a function
of the fluid milk price received by farmers since it is the
main input for milk processors. A time trend is also
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included in the MC function to take account of
technological changes in the industry. Based on these
factors, the MC function is specified in the following
form:
MCt = α0 + α1Wt + α2T

[10]

where Wt is the fluid milk price received by farmers, T is
the trend and t is a time subscript. Substituting equation
[10] into profit maximizing condition [4] and rearranging
the terms, the following linear equation is derived:
Pt = α0 + α1Wt + α2T + α3Qt + Ut

[11]

where Wt, Qt and T are as previously defined,
α 3 = –λ dPt and Ut is N (µ. σ2).
dQt
Taking the first derivative of equation [9] with
respect to Qt, it can be seen that
dPt = 1 ,
dQt
β1
and the market power parameter is the product of 2
regression parameters with a negative sign, λ = -β1α3
(26). In order to identify the degree of market power,
Bresnahan (26) adds one more variable to the demand
equation, namely PtZt. In this paper, it is assumed that
MCs are constant, and therefore, there is no identification
problem in the model. Deodhar and Sheldon (29) also
used this special case of the Bresnahan methodology to
estimate the degree of imperfection in the German
market for banana imports.
In order to measure the degree of imperfection,
equations [9] and [11] need to be estimated. To
empirically implement the described equations, the
demand equation is expressed as
Qt = β0 + β1Pt + β2Zt + β3Tt2 + εt

[12]

where Qt is the retail quantity of fluid milk, Pt is the retail
price of fluid milk, Zt is per-capita GNP and Tt2 is the
squared time trend. It is apparent that equations [11] and
[12] are a simultaneous system for the fluid milk market
and Pt and Qt are endogenous variables. The demand [12]
and first-order condition [11] equations are overidentified. For estimation, we used the 2-stage-leastsquares (2SLS) estimation procedure, in which the
instruments were per-capita GNP, the producer price of
fluid milk, time and squared time trend. We also employed
3-stage-least-squares estimation but there was no
significant improvement over the 2SLS results. Estimated
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parameters and asymptotic standard errors of the
simultaneous model are shown in the Table. All estimations
were carried out using the Shazam 7.0 software.
In general, the results for both equations are plausible
in terms of the statistical significance of individual
parameters and goodness of fit. The R2 values of demand
and the first-order condition are 0.97 and 0.98,
respectively. As indicated by Durbin-Watson statistics at
1% significance, there is no autocorrelation problem in
the demand equation or first-order condition. In the
demand regression, the real fluid milk price and income
variables comply with economic theory and are
statistically significant at the 5% level. In the first-order
condition regression, all variables are statistically
significant at the 5% level. The positive and significant
coefficient for the producer price of fluid milk is
consistent with its expected effect on MC. The negative
and significant time trend implies that MC declined in the
fluid milk market over this period mainly because of
technological changes.
The primary interest of this study was to estimate the
degree of imperfection and its implications for the
industry. In the simultaneous system, the related
parameters for calculating marker power are β1 = 0.342 and α3 = 0.317, and both of these parameters are
statistically significant. Therefore, the market power
parameter for this industry is λ = -(-0.342)(0.317) =
0.11. This parameter suggests that the fluid milk
subsector is not perfectly competitive, but the behavior of

the firms is much closer to competition than to collusion.
Stated differently, the increasing concentration ratio
within the fluid milk subsector has not resulted in
excessive monopoly power being exercised by the firms.
Of course, the large share of fluid milk that is marketed
through milkmen and by direct sales from producers to
consumers could be a limiting factors on firms’ exercise
of market power. In fact, a significant amount of fluid
milk (47%) in Turkey is marketed by milkmen and
through direct sales to consumers from producers (12).

Discussion
The main objective of this study was to measure the
degree of market imperfection in the fluid milk market in
Turkey, a market that the Turkish competition authority
recently received complaints about because of a suspicion
of market imperfection. In this study, we used a
structural econometric model, based on a method
originally proposed by Bresnahan (26). The results show
that the price behavior of firms in this industry is neither
perfectly competitive nor collusive, but their behavior is
much closer to competition than to collusion. Stated
differently, the increasing CR4 has not resulted excessive
market power being exercised in the fluid milk market in
Turkey. The results presented in this article are consistent
with the conclusion of the Turkish competition authority.
The results of this study have some implications for
policy makers, firms and consumers. Policy makers

Table. Two-stage-least–squares estimation results.
Demand Equation
Intercept
Retail price of fluid milk, Pt
Per-capita gross national product, Zt
Squared time trend, T2
R2
Durbin-Watson Statistic
First-Order-Condition
Intercept
Producer price of fluid milk, Wt
Retail quantity of fluid milk, Qt
Time trend, T
R2
Durbin-Watson Statistic

Coefficient
-274.760
-0.342
0.251 E-03
0.583
0.970
1.601
-2.395
2.675
0.317
-5.345
0.980
1.710

t-Ratio
-3.428*
-5.268*
4.171*
4.478*

-0.397
21.040*
2.161*
-1.961**

Note: * Indicates significance at 5% level using 2-tail test.
** Indicates significance at 5% level using 1-tail test.
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should note that this moderate market power might stem
from product differentiation, the image of firms and scale
economies. Moreover, the results imply that there is no
severe price collusion among the firms in this sector. On
the other hand, firms intending to enter this market face
relatively high competition. Regarding consumers, the
results indicate that they enjoy relatively low prices

compared to monopoly prices resulting from rigid
competition in this sector.
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